We investigate whether privatization, competitive forces, and hardening of budget constraints have yet begun to play efficiency-enhancing roles in Russia. The empirical work is based on information from a 1994 survey of privatized and state-owned Russian firms, together representing around 10 percent of Russian manufacturing output. We find robust evidence of a positive impact of privatization on labor productivity: in our basic specifications, we estimate that a ten percentage point increase in private share ownership raises real sales per employee by three to five percent. The evidence for the effect of product market competition is much weaker, depending on measurement and model specification: in some equations, domestic sales concentration is estimated to have a negative impact and the geographic scope of markets a positive effect on productivity, but the results are sensitive to minor changes in specification, and import penetration is never estimated to play a positive disciplinary role. While subsidies (soft budget constraints) are estimated to reduce the pace of restructuring in most of our models, the effect is usually small and rarely precisely estimated. We find some evidence that privatization and subsidy reduction are substitutes, that privatization and competition are complements when the latter is measured as the geographic scope of markets, and that competition and subsidy reduction are independent, in their impacts on Russian enterprise productivity.
empirically for Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. 4 Most of the work has focussed either on privatization policy design or on enterprise restructuring, and only a few studies have attempted to test hypotheses statistically. Although policy discussions contain frequent references to competition, there has been less empirical work in this area; a partial exception is Russia, where Brown et al (1994) and Joskow et al (1994) analyze domestic market structure at the beginning of the reform process. There is as yet, however, no empirical work on the effects of increased competition -either domestic or foreign -on enterprise performance in Russia or other reform economies.
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Russia is a particularly interesting testing ground because it has undergone enormous changes in these areas of reform in recent years. Thus, government subsidies to firms have been massively reduced since 1992 (e.g., Schaffer (1997)), while liberalization has proceeded apace.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) conducts an annual assessment of "progress in transition" according to a 1-4 scale, and in 1995 Russia was awarded a 3 on both price and trade liberalization, only slightly below the most "advanced" reform countries of Central Europe. Moreover, Russia has carried out a major mass privatization programme, transferring shares in more than 12,000 companies from state to private hands (see Boycko et al (1995) or Blasi et al (1997) ).
While standard analysis of market economies stresses the disciplining effects of competition, of hard budget constraints, and of ownership structures on enterprise behavior, 6 we would argue that these factors may be still more important in transition. Western economies tend to be dominated by private ownership, by low levels of state subsidies and interference, and by workably competitive markets, so that the general environment may exert a disciplining force even on a firm characterized by none of these. Subsidized, state-owned monopolies usually operate in rather competitive markets for managers, labor, and most other factors; they can avail themselves of the latest technologies, organizational innovations, and managerial techniques; their performance can be compared, according to a common set of standards, with neighboring privately owned, competitive firms; and instances of gross malfeasance and waste can be publicly evaluated and remedied through a democratic process. All of these factors go quite some distance towards mitigating inefficiencies traditionally associated with state involvement and monopoly power. The situation in Russia (and other transition economies) stands in stark contrast, increasing the potential benefits from privatization, competition, and harder budget constraints.
In the following section, we outline hypotheses about the relationship between ownership form, product market competition, and the hardness of budget constraints, on the one hand, and enterprise performance, on the other. We also describe our data, our measure of performance, the indicators of ownership, competition, and budget constraints, and the other variables we employ in this paper. The specifications are discussed and results reported in the third section, while the fourth draws conclusions.
HYPOTHESES AND DATA
Our intention is to bring together in the transition context a variety of strands of the structure-conduct-performance and corporate governance literatures, rather than to offer new theoretical insights. In the following sub-section we outline the estimation framework and hypotheses, and in the subsequent subsections we describe the data and consider the specification of performance, ownership, market structure, hard budget constraints, and control variables, respectively. The basic hypotheses to be tested are that, controlling for other relevant factors, private share ownership, product market competition, and hard budget constraints have positive impacts on company performance, in the sense we make precise below. 6 See eg. Bishop, Kay and Mayer (1994) , Boardman and Vining (1989) , Geroski and Jacquemin (1981) , Megginson et al (1994) , Nickell (1995) , and Shleifer and Vishny (1994) .
Hypotheses
The underlying framework is captured in the following reduced-form equation:
P i = f (own i , comp i , imp i , hbc i , X i )
where i indexes firms; P i denotes an indicator of enterprise performance; own i specifies ownership; comp i indicates domestic market structure; imp i denotes international competition; hbc i indicates hardness of budget constraint; and X i is a vector of other covariates of performance, for example industry and regional dummies and proxy variables for the "quality" of the firm and for its ability to adjust to the dramatically changed environment. Our method is to estimate this equation with a wide variety of alternative measures of each of the independent variables of interest, including interactions among them.
Commencing with domestic market structure effects, the industrial organization literature contains numerous papers which estimate the relationship between company performance and domestic market structure (see e.g. Scherer and Ross (1990) . Performance in this literature is usually measured as profitability or price-cost margin, and market structure by concentration indices or Herfindahls (see, e.g., Cowling and Waterson (1976) or Sleuwaegen and Dehandschuffer (1986) ).
More competition implies lower profits because the industrial organization literature predicts a positive relationship between profitability and the degree of concentration (see e.g. Tirole (1989) ).
Although also implicit in many earlier discussions, more recent work on efficiency and technical
change has gone on to analyze whether incentives are dulled by monopoly power, so that competitive firms will also be more efficient in terms of factor productivities and innovativeness (see eg. Nickell (1995) ). These arguments carry over to the transition context, suggesting that competition may be a major force leading firms to raise productivity, reduce waste and improve performance (see eg. Blanchard et al (1990) , Stiglitz (1994) Dyker and Barrow (1995) ).
In recent years, international competition has become one of the most significant factors determining market power in particular countries. This has been increasingly reflected in empirical work which has sought to relate profitability, or conversely technical efficiency, to measures of import penetration (see eg. Geroski and Jacquemin (1981) , Esposito and Esposito (1971) ). While analyses of progress in transition stress the importance of free trade, increased exports to the West and import penetration (see eg. EBRD (1995 ), World Bank (1996 ), there have been virtually no attempts to test the hypothesis of imports as a competitive pressure on firms in the transition context (but see Earle and Woergoetter (1993) ).
Although the conventional view of product market competition, whether domestic or foreign, is that it works to discipline firm behavior, an alternative argument is that excessive competition may prevent firms from accumulating rents that could be used for undertaking research and development (Nelson and Winter (1982) ), thus reducing dynamic efficiency. In the transition context, liberalization led to tremendous shifts of demand, as well as a breakdown of coordination among firms (as discussed by, e.g., Blanchard and Kremer (1997) ). If increased competition has reduced the resources firms have to make new investments and acquire new technologies that will improve their productivity, then liberalization could be associated with a short-run reduction of enterprise performance. Ickes, Ryterman, and Tenev (1995) argue that "very intense" competition may negatively affect enterprise adjustment where adjustment costs are high, and they examine some qualitative indicators of the extent of adjustment. Another factor is that competition may force some firms to exit, which may confound the interpretation of short-run competitionperformance relationships.
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Concerning the role of the state, the Western literature has paid attention to issues of both ownership and soft budget constraints, examining the relative performance of state owned and private firms and the influence of subsidies (e.g., Tirole (1991) , Shleifer and Vishny (1994) ). Stateowned or -influenced firms may behave as if their objectives embraced politically imposed social targets. Moreover, performance may be harder to evaluate and corporate governance more difficult to enforce under state ownership (see eg. Sappington and Stiglitz (1988) and Estrin and Perotin (1991) ). This leads to predictions that state owned firms will be less efficient than their privately owned counterparts and that soft budget constraints will induce inefficient behavior. Prominently in the transition context, Kornai (1980) has argued that poor enterprise performance in socialist economies was associated with soft-budget constraints, that is to say the knowledge of managers that their firm would probably be subsidized by the authorities whatever their own performance.
Clearly the eradication of soft budget constraints, especially when associated with the disappearance of company-specific rents because of the more competitive market environment, should also lead to an improvement in company performance, notably in the areas of reducing costs and raising efficiency.
The hypothesis about the differential efficiency effects of state versus private ownership has been tested in a variety of ways, usually in the context of production or cost functions with dummy 7 variables controlling for different ownership. The British privatization of the 1980s allowed for empirical tests of productivity changes as a consequence of changes in ownership from state to private (see eg. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and Bishop, Kay and Mayer (1994) ), while Megginson et al (1994) has extended the analysis to include privatizations in a number of different countries.
There has been rather little empirical analysis of the impact of soft budget constraints, however.
Some case study evidence indicates that this factor has been important in improved company performance in Central Europe (see eg Pinto et al (1993 ), Carlin et al (1994 , Estrin et al (1995) .
An important problem with many of the empirical studies of privatization is that firms were generally faced with harder budget constraints and exposed to increased competition at the same time they were privatized, either because the original state enterprise was split up into several pieces that were forced to compete with each other or because entry barriers or import restrictions were reduced. The general conclusion of the British studies was that increased product market competition was a more important factor than new private ownership in improving company behavior, but the simultaneity of the two processes and the small number of cases have made it difficult to distinguish their relative contributions. Vining and Boardman (1992) have sought to distinguish between ownership and competition effects on enterprise behavior, but the firms in their sample had not experienced a change in either their ownership or the market environment they faced, which raises particularly difficult problems concerning the potential endogeneity of these factors.
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Of course, privatization, competition, and budget constraints may not have independent effects, but could be complements or substitutes as mechanisms of corporate governance. In the transition context, there has been considerable speculation (e.g., Gates, Milgrom, and Roberts (1994) or Friedman and Johnson (1995) ) that certain types of reform may be highly complementary.
For instance, the early transition literature on the design of policy packages and of "sequencing" (e.g., Lipton and Sachs (1990) ) suggested that stabilization would enhance the benefits of price 8 Ownership may change endogenously as well, of course, although this is less likely in a mass privatization program. In Earle and Estrin (1997) , we examine the endogeneity of ownership in the same data set analyzed in this paper. In our examination of the robustness of the results below, we also include instrumental variables estimates where ownership is treated as endogenous. Market structure at the beginning of transition followed the dictates of central planning (see Ickes and Ryterman (1995) for a theoretical analysis of the way in which the planners' objectives would be manifested in industrial structure), and can thus be treated as exogenous, even if its subsequent evolution cannot. We therefore set out to investigate in the transition context whether one can identify a positive relationship between company performance in the sense of efficiency or productivity on the one hand, and private ownership, increased competition at home and abroad (less domestic concentration and more import penetration), and harder budget constraints on the other. The remainder of this section describes our data and considers appropriate ways to measure the four variables in question.
Data
In this paper, we employ evidence from an in-depth survey of 394 Russian industrial enterprises. Organized by the World Bank, the survey was conducted by VTsIOM (the AllRussian Center for Public Opinion Analysis) in July 1994. The sample was drawn from a complete list of all Russian industrial firms in 1991 with employment greater than 15. The population list was first stratified by industry and region, and then an initial sample was randomly drawn. Sample replacement (of firms that declined to participate) was implemented on the basis of industry and region. Fan and Lee (1995) and the appendix to Commander, Fan, and Schaffer (1996) contain detailed descriptions of the survey. Commander, Dhar, and Yemtsov (1996) ). The survey exhibits some bias towards larger firms, but regional discrepancies between sample and population appear to be minimal. Although the sample is not perfectly representative, its coverage is broad enough to permit cautious inferences on corporate behavior in Russian industry as a whole. One disadvantage of the data set stems from the timing of the survey. Given that the data were collected just at the close of the voucher privatization, in July 1994, is it not rather too early to expect to see an impact of competitive forces or of ownership change on firm behaviour?
Many Russian companies were privatized somewhat earlier, however, including not only the lease-buyouts of 1990-92 but also those firms privatized in the State Privatization Program in late 1992 (when the program finally started after long discussion) and 1993. Unfortunately, the survey did not ask the firms to report the date at which their ownership changed, so we cannot distinguish which firms had been privatized for some time from those for which the process was barely concluded. 10 Viewed as measurement error, this would tend to bias the results against 9 The survey also included 45 firms in the new private sector, drawn from separate regional lists. We have excluded these new start-ups from the current analysis, because we cannot observe them "before" and "after" the reform and they do not face the same restructuring problems. 10 On the other hand, "the" date of privatization is frequently not well-defined where large enterprises in transitional economies are concerned. Usually privatization is a long process, with shares conveyed at several times over a period lasting as long as a few years. Moreover, unlike small shops, which were generally privatized in one blow to a single buyer (see Earle et al (1994) finding an impact of ownership. It would be desirable, of course, to collect more recent data, but that is an undertaking for future research.
Measuring Enterprise Performance in Transition
Firms in the former socialist economies were structured very differently from competitive capitalist firms: products were produced for planners, not markets; plan targets were taut with rewards only for full attainment; and genuine financial controls were virtually non-existent (for a classic summary, see Kornai (1992) ). This led to emphasis on physical production for the state with little reference to product salability or quality, and little concern for cost, particularly with respect to labor, capital and energy. Profitability was not an important indicator of performance and because relative prices did not reflect scarcity, had little economic content. Quality problems as well as weaknesses in innovation were exacerbated by price distortions, for example in favor of necessities and intermediate but against final products, and especially (in the later years) in overly cheap energy inputs.
Measuring the process of adjustment from such a starting point to that implied by a competitive market system is a multi-faceted phenomenon, but most observers would agree that improvements in productivity play a pivotal role. 11 In this paper, we use average real labor productivity, the real sales-employment ratio in 1994, as a proxy for firm performance.
Consistent with conventional studies of the determinants of firm productivity, we examine the impact of ownership structure on the level of productivity rather than on productivity change, in a cross-section of firms. Change is very hard to measure in Russia because of hyperinflation, massive changes in relative prices, poor and inconsistent accounting practices, and general noisiness in the data.
In order to control for systematic variation in labor productivity due to a variety of causes (for instance, different capital-labor ratios), we include a measure of past (pre-reform) labor on Central Europe and Barberis et al (1996) on Russia), a period of variable length elapses between the formal transfer of control rights and the shareholders' meeting, when those rights can be executed. Only when a core investor acquires a majority stake is the date of privatization relatively unambiguous, but such cases are exceedingly rare in Russia (Earle and Estrin (1997) ). 11 See Tirole (1988) on restructuring in capitalist firms, and McMillan (1996) for a survey of restructuring in transitional economies). Earle and Estrin (1997) argue that the multidimensionality fo restructuring suggests that it may be desirable to try to construct an index of overall restructuring that includes a number of separate components. productivity as an independent variable. In all specifications, including those reported below, the coefficient on this variable is estimated to be much less than one (about .4), with a standard error suggesting that the difference between the coefficient and unity is highly statistically significant (in all cases, the p-value for this hypothesis test is <.001). Thus, the data appear to reject the specification of the dependent variable as the change rather than the level of labor productivity.
An alternative interpretation of the equation with lagged labor productivity on the right-hand side is that the dependent variable represents an indicator of restructuring, where more restructuring means that the firm has been relatively successful in reducing employment while keeping sales up, or in raising sales while keeping employment down.
The impact of competition, ownership, and budget constraints on labor productivity may of course work through several channels, including actions to enhance efficiency by reducing input waste, to increase sales by improving output quality, and to augment the quantity and quality of the capital stock and improve the technology through new investment. All of these channels are likely to be relevant, and our analysis does not distinguish them. If, under the pressure of harder constraints, competitive markets and monitoring by new owners, some managers have made well-chosen investments that have increased labor productivity in their firms, then this is a positive development that should be taken into account. If they have improved the quality or variety of the firm's products, enabling them to raise their sales, then again this should be taken into account. The reduced form approach used in this paper seeks to measure the overall impact of privatization and competition on firm performance, not to identify the various channels through which such an impact takes place.
Although it would be desirable to identify those specific channels, and to estimate a structural model of the determinants of productivity, it does not appear to be possible to distinguish among them in the Russian context. Investment is hard to measure under Russian accounting practices, and the available evidence indicates that there has been very little investment in most Russian enterprises; certainly there has been little outside finance available.
Nor, because of the difficulty of valuing unsold output, is it straightforward to measure the change in real output, to distinguish increases in productive efficiency from other reasons for an increase in revenue. For all these reasons, we believe that real labor productivity is a more reliable indicator than any measure of total factor productivity that could be estimated with Russian data. Employment has dropped dramatically, on average, while nominal sales have skyrocketed in Russia; consistent with the well-known decline in aggregate industrial output, however, the nominal sales increase is masking real declines in most firms. Most of the firms in the sample also show a decline in real productivity, but 10-15 percent of them actually show an increase.
Given the enormous recession in the Russian economy and the tendency in even Western firms for employment to adjust less than equiproportionately to output changes, our specification attempts to measure the degree to which firms have maintained sales in spite of the widespread downturn and have cut employment despite the overall tendency in Russia to hoard labor and maintain the strong tradition of job security. 
Ownership Change in Russia
The pace and magnitude of ownership change in Russia in the early 1990s dwarf any contemporary or historical comparisons. From an initial condition of nearly 100 percent state ownership in the manufacturing sector in 1990, a majority of enterprises had been mostly privatized by mid-1994. Table 2 shows PRIVATE, the percentage of shares held by the private sector for the sample of firms in the World Bank survey data. Overall, 62 percent of formerly state-owned shares were privately owned, although the pattern differs by branch, with rates of privatization highest in consumer goods sectors and lowest in energy and fuel. 12 We noted above that the Western literature argues private firms will perform better than state owned ones, but the comparison is typically made between large publicly quoted corporations, where potential takeovers and the stock market can play a significant role in disciplining company performance, and public enterprises, where they cannot. Several authors (e.g., Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) , Earle and Estrin (1995) , and Aghion and Blanchard (1996) ) have stressed that the benefits of privatization depend on whether the owners are outsiders to the firm. Privatization in the transitional economies has generally not taken the standard form of selling to highest bidder, associated with the simultaneous emergence of a 12 The patterns of ownership structure and the privatization program that gave rise to them are analyzed in greater detail in Earle and Estrin (1997) .
capital market and external ownership. Instead, most countries have followed a strategy of "mass privatization," tending to result in highly dispersed ownership, or they have adopted programs granting large shareholdings to employees. Indeed, in Russia a combination of these was done.
It is not obvious that privatization will always lead to improved governance, and therefore improved enterprise performance, in this situation.
Elsewhere (e.g., 1997) we have analyzed the prevalence of different types of owners and the concentration of private outside ownership in Russia. Here, we limit ourselves to a consideration of the private versus state comparison. We do, however, consider some robustness issues. In addition to estimating the impact of total private shareholding, we examine the distribution of shares carrying voting rights across state and private owners. The Russian privatization program produced two types of non-voting shares: "type A" given to workers under Variant I of the State Privatization Program and "type B" held by the state in many companies where the state's total shareholding exceeded 20 percent of all shares. The result of taking both types into account, by removing them from the voting shareholdings is shown in table 2 as the variable PRIVATE-VOTING. Taking into account the existence of type A shares tends to reduce the fraction of voting shares held privately, but taking into account type B tends to raise it, so on average the two effects roughly cancel, and the private proportion differs little. Particular firms shift a great deal, however, so this could be an important factor to take into account when we consider the association between private ownership and enterprise performance. We also consider an alternative functional form for the relationship between private share ownership and enterprise performance, namely that the relationship is not linear but rather a step-function with a single step at majority private share ownership. We define a dummy variable PRIVATE>.5 defined as equal to one if PRIVATE > .5, and equal to zero otherwise. About 60 percent of the sample had been majority privatized by July 1994, as shown in the table. Finally, we also investigate, in the results reported below, the possibility that private ownership is endogenous, for instance because firms with higher labor productivity, or greater potential to have their labor productivity increased, were more likely to be privatized.
Domestic and International Competition
In measuring the degree of product market competition, we employ a variety of alternative indicators, both because theories of the impact of competition on performance (summarized, e.g., in Tirole (1988) or Scherer and Ross (1990) ) do not suggest any single measure as appropriate for all circumstances (see also Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1986)) and because of the patchiness of the available data. We therefore report seven alternative measures of domestic market concentration and import penetration in Russian markets, each picking up slightly different notions of market competition. Means for the variables by industry groups are shown in table 2.
Our first set of indicators draws upon two studies of concentration in Russia: Brown, Ickes, and Ryterman (1994, henceforth BIR) and Joskow, Schmalensee, and Tsukanova (1993, henceforth JST) . BIR present 4-firm sales concentration ratios for 2-digit branches in 1989, of which there are 16 in our data; we have labeled this variable CR4B. JST present 4-firm sales concentration ratios at a more disaggregated level (approximately 4-digit industries) in 1991, but covering such a limited subset of industry that using this variable alone would reduce our sample size considerably. Although we also estimated equations using only the JST information, we do not report them as the results differed little from those below. However, to examine the robustness of the results using only the BIR measures, we have also combined the two variables, using the JST variable when it is available and otherwise using CR4B; the new variable takes on 40 values in our data set and is labeled CR4BJ in table 2.
13 Although CR4BJ combines different levels of aggregation, we would argue that the definitions of the industrial classification levels are substantially arbitrary when comparing across heterogeneous classes of products; thus, the fourdigit level of automobile production need not correspond to the four-digit level in food, clothing, or metallurgy. The appropriate measure should rather be defined according to the scope of the product market (itself an imprecisely defined concept inasmuch as it depends on the extent of substitutability among a potentially wide variety of products), and there is no necessity that the scope (or extent of substitutability) is at the same level of disaggregation in all industries.
14 Given that all measures of market structure are only proxies for the underlying concept of competition, which is itself unmeasureable, our approach is to consider all reasonable indicators.
The variables show quite a high variance in concentration: CR4BJ has a mean of .27 and a range from .03 to 1. As pointed out by BIR, the mean is surprisingly low given the traditional view of 13 Combining these two variables also assumes that there was little change in market shares from 1989 to 1991, which seems reasonable since the major Russian reforms started in 1992. 14 See Pittman and Werden (1990) for a discussion of the divergence between SIC industries and the appropriate definition of the antitrust market.
large scale of socialist firms, and perhaps reflects the large size of the Russian market in comparison with the typical socialist firm in the Central European countries.
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The potential for foreign competition to exert some disciplinary effect in Russia is frequently discounted (for instance, in JST, p. 303). However, the aggregate import share in domestic consumption is rather high, which suggests that we should undertake an explicit test of the hypothesis. Measures of import penetration are hard to come by for Russia; we investigated two alternatives, but they yielded nearly identical results. Thus, we report results only for the variable IP, which is defined as the ratio of imports from the "far abroad" (which excludes the former Soviet Union) to output+imports-exports for each sector in 1994. 16 The precise functional form by which import penetration should enter the equation has been the source of some controversy, and we have investigated a variety of alternatives. In the results reported below, we enter IP additively, but the overall findings are robust across alternative specifications.
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Given the difficulties in choosing the appropriate size of the market for any given firm and of measuring the strength of actual and potential competitors in it, we have also investigated a group of subjective indicators of the extent of market power, based on responses to survey questions. Managers were asked to report whether they had "major competitors for [their] major products" and, if so, the total number and the number of competitors that are foreign. The concept of "major competitors" is not precisely defined in the survey question, and no doubt it would have been difficult to do so in economically meaningful terms. Because the underlying concept cannot be directly measured, however, the managers' subjective evaluation may be an indicator worth investigating. We define MAJORCOMP as the number of major competitors the manager reports that the firm faces and, under the presumption that foreign competition may be a
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We also calculated Hirschman-Herfindahl indices for a set of approximately two-digit industries based on the limited information available in our sample; the results differed only trivially from those reported below. 16 The source for this variable is Russian Economic Trends (1995). Our other measure, which is based on World Bank information, includes imports from the "near abroad" as well, but it is very highly correlated with IP. 17 Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 79) suggest that the effect of imports should be multiplicative, rather than additive, and recommend adjusting the concentration ratio for import penetration by multiplying the former by one minus the latter. In fact, we estimated a variety of alternative specifications of import penetration, including it separately, omitting the interaction with concentration, and including interactions with all the other measures of concentration discussed in this paper. The qualitative nature of the results we report below are not sensitive to these changes of specification. particularly powerful disciplinary device, FORCOMP as the number of major foreign competitors. The absence of any major competitors whatsoever is reported by 25 percent of managers, implying that they believe they are monopolists or dominant firms in their industry.
As shown in table 2, however, the mean of MAJORCOMP is 21, suggesting that a significant number of managers do perceive major competition. Concerning imports, a substantial number of Russian firms -51 observations, or 20 percent of the valid sample --report that they face foreign competition. The average number of foreign competitors is 9 (including zeroes). We tried a variety of alternative specifications of these variables, including using dummies for the presence of any major or foreign competitor and interacting them with other indicators, and we report representative specifications below.
Transportation and infrastructural deficiencies probably act as a barrier not only to foreign competition, but to domestic producers located in other regions as well. To provide some assessment of the geographic dimension in which firms operate, we provide, in Table 2 , a summary of the firms' reports on the extent to which revenue is generated locally (RAYON), regionally (OBLAST), nationally (NATIONAL), from the former Soviet Union (FSU), and from other non-FSU export markets (EXPORT). While on average 50 percent of revenue is derived from markets which the firms describe as national, there is considerable heterogeneity. The primary hypothesis for these variables is that the wider the geographic scope of the market, the more competition faced by the firm; a secondary hypothesis is that exposure to international quality standards induces firms to restructure (Prokop and Sabel (1996) ). The geographic size of the market may interact with other variables, and we also investigated a wide variety of alternative specifications.
The final competition indicator reported in Table 2 also comes from the survey:
PRICONT is a dummy equal 1 if the firm reports that the prices for its major products are subject to state control. The 1991 Law "On Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Goods Markets" defined dominant market position as 35 percent or more (to be set annually by the State Committee on Anti-Monopoly Policy), and the 35 percent definition was used in the "anti-monopoly lists" which the government ordered local anti-monopoly committees to compile in early 1992. According to JST (p. 339), "[I]n August 1992, the Gaidar government ordered federal and regional price committees to regulate the prices of most goods produced by firms on the monopoly registers." Although this authority was supposed to expire at the end of 1993, it seems that much of the regulation continued. Thus, the existence of price controls may reflect market power, at least as perceived by local anti-monopoly committees.
Hardness of Budget Constraint
Many authors have stressed that the key factor in improved enterprise performance in transitional economies is rupturing the cosy relationship between enterprises and the state (see e.g. Frydman and Rapacyzynski (1994) ; Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995) ). In principle, soft budget constraints could arise not only from direct state subsidies but also from low commitment ability by any source of finance, including banks (as emphasized by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Berglof and Roland (1996) ). But commitment ability cannot be measured, nor can the ex-ante expectations of managers or enterprise owners concerning the probability of a bailout should their enterprise or project fail (at least not with our data set). We can only measure, expost, whether the firm received state support and the amount that was received. We do include all channels of support, including all federal government subsidies and investments, tax benefits, preferential credits (for conversion, investment, or other purposes -with an interest rate below the Central Bank discount rate), extra-budgetary funds, tax exemptions and other benefits associated with foreign trade, and others (especially including local government subsidies). We also include the value of tax arrears in our measure of assistance from the state in 1994.
Our indicators are shown in table 2. A dummy variable for government support in 1992 is labelled GOVSUPPORT 92, and 26 percent of firms report positively. GOVSUPPORT 92-94 is the corresponding dummy for any support over the three year period for which the survey provides information. The variable GOVASSISTANCE 92 indicates the amount of assistance received that year, and TOTASSISTANCE 94 measures the amount of state subsidies in 1994, including implicit transfers through tax arrears (discounted to the survey date using the relevant inflation rates). Other proxies, in addition to these measures of subsidies to the firm, might include the scale of production for the state, the purchase of inputs from the state, or the proportion of output sold through state intermediaries. We intend to investigate these variables in future research.
Controls
Although the focus of this paper concerns the influence of private ownership, product market competition, and harder budget constraints -variables that are instruments of or at least may be influenced by government policy -on enterprise discipline, a number of other factors may also determine the extent of enterprise adjustment. Most importantly, enterprises may differ in the their ability to adjust to the new environment. Some enterprises were hit by larger shocks to their product demands or to their input supplies, and even for the same size of shock, the technology and organization of firms affect their flexibility. We have investigated a wide variety of proxies for these considerations. Among them are industry and region dummies (which could also be related to product market structure) at alternative levels of disaggregation, capacity utilization in 1991 (CAP UTIL 91), the proportion of equipment older than 15 years (OLD EQUIPMENT), and size measured as number of employees in 1990 (EMPLOYMENT 90).
Specifications using these variables, the descriptive statistics for which can be found in tables 1 and 2, are reported below. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS
As discussed above, existing theories of firm behavior are not sufficiently precise to imply particular structural equations for the impact on productivity of factors such as private ownership, competition in product markets, and hard budget constraints. Our approach to testing hypotheses is therefore to examine a large number of alternative reduced form specifications of equation (1), in order to ascertain the robustness of observed relationships. Space limitations prevent us from presenting more than a small fraction of all the equations we have estimated, but we have chosen to report representative specifications that reveal the patterns of robustness and nonrobustness in the data.
Specifications
In the results below, our specifications are organized as follows. We first consider a basic model, where the only controls are broad industry and region categories, as well as the lagged dependent variable. We consider alternative measures of product market structure. Next, we examine an alternative model in which the controls are relatively detailed regions and proxies for the quality of the firm and its ability to adjust to the dramatic changes in its environment. We then go on to examine robustness issues concerning the definition of the ownership and budget constraint variables. Finally, we investigate specifications in which the three determinants are permitted to interact, in order to test for possible complementarities (or substitutabilities) among them. Table 3 shows our first set of results. In all six specifications in the table, we employ PRIVATE and GOVSUPPORT92 as our measures of ownership and budget constraints, respectively, and we control for broad industries and regions and for the natural logarithm of labor productivity in 1990 (PRODUCTIVITY90). The six specifications differ only in the measure of competition employed: specifications 3.1 and 3.2 contain only the two direct measures of domestic market structure, CR4B and CR4BJ, while specification 3.3 adds IMPORT, the import penetration ratio, and 3.4 adds the geographic scope of markets (OBLAST through EXPORT, with RAYON the omitted category) to CR4B. Specification 3.5 contains the subjective measures by managers of the extent of product market competition, total (MAJORCOMP) and foreign (FORCOMP), entered in logarithmic form (with 1 added, so that the firm is itself counted as a major competitor), and 3.6 contains the dummy for price controls, which may be interpreted as a proxy for the subjective evaluation of the firm's market power by the local Anti-Monopoly Committee! Across all specifications in the table, the estimated coefficient on PRIVATE is statistically significant and economically meaningful, suggesting higher productivity of 3 to 5 percent associated with an increase in private share ownership of 10 percent. The large magnitude of the estimated impact should, however, be interpreted in the context of Russian industry in the early 1990s: steeper falls in sales than employment resulting in declining real productivity overall. Our results suggest that firms with greater private ownership have, ceteris paribus, been more successful at either keeping sales up or at adjusting employment in line with the demand shock they face, relative to firms with greater state ownership. An objection to the results in table 3 concerns the nature of the control variables. The use of industry and region controls implies that the competition results presented so far reflect only within-industry and within-region effects. But the industry and region effects may themselves be related to market structure and, depending on the correct definition of the scope of the product market, they may be swamping any effects of the competition measures. At the same time, the lagged dependent variable may not adequately capture interfirm variation in ability to adjust to the dramatic shocks associated with price and trade liberalization. We therefore investigated a large number of alternative specifications of the control variables, using capacity utilization (CAPUTIL91), the age of the firm's equipment (OLDEQUIPMENT), and size (EMPLOYMENT90), among a number of other variables, 19 and we also examined the effect of financial difficulties, but found no difference from the results we report below. 19 Employment may be suspect because size and market share are likely to be correlated, but the 21 using industry and region controls at more disaggregated levels. In almost no case did the results provide evidence of a significant positive impact of competition on productivity. The single exception is shown in table 4, together with some tests of robustness. Table 4 shows the results from estimating a series of specifications using CR4B and CR4BJ as competition measures, with alternative sets of control variables. Specifications 4.1 and 4.2 have only detailed regions and the lagged dependent variable as controls, 4.3 and 4.4 have only CAPUTIL91, OLDEQUIPMENT, EMPLOYMENT90, and log(PRODUCTIVITY90) as controls, and 4.5 and 4.6 include both the latter set and the detailed regions. The estimated impact of private share ownership is even more pronounced in these equations than in those shown in table 3, with a larger magnitude and a higher level of statistical significance.
Results
GOVSUPPORT92 has a consistently negative, but again statistically insignificant impact.
The competition measures are insignificant in the first four specifications, but where all controls are included simultaneously, the estimated coefficient of CR4B becomes much greater and attains statistical significance at the 5 percent level. The magnitude of the point estimate suggests a large response of real productivity to domestic market concentration: a 10 percent increase in the sales concentration ratio is estimated, in this specification, to reduce real productivity by nearly 18 percent. As shown in the table, however, this result does not hold for CR4BJ, which, although following a similar pattern to CR4B in the magnitude of the estimated coefficient across specifications, never comes in the range of conventional levels of statistical significance (the p-value is .14 in the best specification, 4.6), nor for any of the other competition measures in any combinations (results not shown). Nor is the CR4B result robust to a number of small changes of specification. Thus, while a very particular specification of the equation can produce evidence of a positive impact of domestic market structure (although not of imports) on enterprise performance, the evidence must be judged rather weak.
The next two tables investigate the robustness of the results with an alternative sample and with alternative measures of private ownership and hard budget constraints. The first specification in table 5 excludes the fuel and energy sectors, which tend to be highly concentrated and relatively unprivatized, as well as rather special in terms of their relationship with the state.
The sample change has little impact on the conclusion that the data provide evidence for an results reported below are robust to dropping this variable from the equation.
impact of privatization but little or none for effects of a competitive product market and a hard budget constraint on productivity. Finally, specification 5.5 includes highly detailed industry and region controls, in an attempt to see whether the ownership finding is not an artefact from sectoral differences that have not been adequately controlled for. The collinearity between CR4B and the industry dummies means that the former must be dropped from the equation, but the results show that the impact of private ownership on productivity appears to be robust to this sort of sensitivity test, also. Table 6 reports the results from two alternative specifications of the budget constraint variable: the amount of government assistance in 1992 (GOVASSISTANCE92) and a dummy for the receipt of any assistance in 1992 . In neither case is the estimated impact of receiving subsidy, or a larger size of subsidy, negative and significant; indeed in specification 6.1, the coefficient is positive and significant, although very small. Again in these equations, the estimated effect of PRIVATE remains robustly large and significant, while the impact of concentration is estimated to be insignificantly different from zero. Finally, we turn to the question of reform complementarity: Are the benefits of one type of reform increased when another reform is adopted beforehand or simultaneously? Or are benefits reduced because the other reform is sufficient to produce the benefits on its own? Or do the reforms have independent effects so that doing one neither enhances nor diminishes the benefits of doing the other? It is particularly the first possibility that is intriguing, because it would suggest the importance of proper sequencing and of careful design of policy packages, to achieve the desired results. It would also be consistent with the notion that a successful reform strategy involves a change of system rather than a piecemeal, partial approach.
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We measure the magnitude of reforms, as seen from enterprises, in some of the ways that we have considered before: the extent of private share ownership, the structure of product markets and geographic scope of markets, and the presence of government subsidies. Table 7 reports the results of regressions where we include pairwise interactions between the three factors, including CR4B and geographic scope in separate equations and controlling for broad industries and regions as well as the lagged dependent variable. In specification 71, which employs CR4B as the measure of competitive pressure, complementarity would imply a negative sign on the interaction term of PRIVATE*CR4B and on the interaction of PRIVATE*GOVSUPPORT92 (because the impact of PRIVATE on productivity is positive, while that of CR4B and GOVSUPPORT92 is negative), while it would imply a positive sign on the interaction CR4B*GOVSUPPORT92. The point estimates are consistent with complementarity between PRIVATE and CR4B and between CR4B and GOVSUPPORT92, but they are consistent with substitutability between PRIVATE and GOVSUPPORT92; moreover, only the last relationship is statistically significant. The results suggest that privatization and competition may work together to discipline firms, as may competition and budget constraint hardness, but privatization and budget constraints appear to work against each other in the sense that the marginal benefit of pursuing either is reduced when more of the other has already been implemented. The issue is related to, but not precisely the same as, the debate over "big bang" versus "gradualist" approaches to reform. In principle, complementary policies could all be introduced gradually, but the greater the degree of complementarity, however, the smaller the payoff to the sort of policy experimentation usually associated with gradualism (Dewatripont and Roland (1996) ).
Turning to specification 7.2, which employs the geographic scope of product markets as the measure of competitive pressure, complementarity would imply that the coefficients on the interaction terms between PRIVATE and the geographic variables should be positive and increasing from OBLAST through EXPORT, while those on the interactions with GOVSUPPORT92 should be negative and decreasing; the coefficient on the interaction PRIVATE*GOVSUPPORT92 should be negative.
The results provide evidence of complementarity between private ownership and the geographic scope of markets, and to a lesser extent of substitutability between privatization and hard budget constraints, but the coefficients on the interactions between geographic scope and budget constraints follow no consistent patterns: these variables appear to be independent in their impact on enterprise productivity.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have made an initial attempt to measure whether the recent change of regime in Russia has had consequences for enterprise behavior. That some aspects of behavior have changed substantially is not in doubt, as a glance at our summary statistics or a few visits to Russian enterprises can attest. But whether those changes can be linked in a systematic way to policies in such areas as privatization, liberalization or to the hardening of budget constraints is trickier.
Some might argue that it is still too early to look for systematic relationships. The privatization program only finished its first, "mass" phase in mid-1994 (the time of the survey from which we draw most of our information in this paper), and sales of the remaining shares and companies are still ongoing. Competition is also only gradually evolving, as new companies grow large enough to compete with the formerly state-owned behemoths and as foreigners gingerly test the water. Our results however suggest that some patterns are beginning to emerge.
Privatization seems to have a clear and substantial effect on the sales-employment ratio, one which is robust across a wide variety of specifications. By contrast we could find only relatively weak evidence that competition is also beginning to play a significant role. Only in a very particular specification is domestic sales concentration estimated to have a negative impact on productivity, while import penetration is never estimated to play a positive disciplinary function. This conclusion is affected by the use of neither subjective measures by managers nor the views revealed by the actions of anti-monopoly committees in controlling prices. There is also only slight evidence that the geographic scope of firms' markets is associated with their performance, despite the conventional wisdom that market power in Russia is exercised primarily on the regional level. While subsidies are estimated to reduce the pace of restructuring in most of our models, the effect is small and imprecisely estimated. We find some evidence that privatization and subsidy reduction are substitutes, that privatization and competition are complements when the latter is measured as the geographic scope of markets, and that competition and subsidy reduction are independent, in their impacts on Russian enterprise productivity.
competition and budget constraint variables. Notes: Industry groups were constructed on the basis of Goskomstat categories: "Metals & Chemicals" includes ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy; "Heavy Machinery" includes electrotechnical industry, defense industry, shipbuilding industry and heavy machine building; "Light Machinery" includes machine tools, computers, automobiles, agricultural machinery, radio industry, communication and electronics, metal constructions and machinery repair; "Wood & Construction Materials" includes lumber, wood working industry, and construction materials; "Consumer Goods" includes textiles, clothing industry, food processing and meat and milk industry. Regions use the Goskomstat grouping except that Moscow is distinguished, Far East is included in "East Siberia" and both Northern and NorthWestern regions are included in "North".
Source: Earle and Estrin (1997) . Column 1 and 2 are authors' calculations from sample. Column 3 is from Lee (1996) , based on Goskomstat registry of 10,582 industrial firms in Russia in 1991. Note: "Industries" and "Regions" represent seven industries and three regions, respectively. Standard errors calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix. Note: "Industries" and "Regions" represent seven industries and three regions, respectively, except where they are indicated as "detailed": "detailed industries" include twenty-five industrial sectors (OKONH classification of primary product) and "detailed regions" include nine economic regions of Russia. Restricted sample excludes firms in the sectors of fuel and energy. Instruments for ownership included variables representing method of privatization, industry, region and size. Standard errors calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix. Note: "Industries" and "Regions" represent seven industries and three regions, respectively. Standard errors calculated using heteroscedasticity -consistent variance-covariance matrix. Note: "Industries" and "Regions" represent seven industries and three regions, respectively. Standard errors calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix.
